

THE JAPANESE NEGOTIATIONS

Soon after coming back to Japan I had to visit Ise to worship, and then on account of taking cold and badly coughing (afterwards I knew I was suffering then from tuberculosis). I had to confine myself at home for some days. I studied the American-Japanese understanding draft wired from my ambassador Admiral Nomura and at last was able to believe that the negotiations were largely conducted without my knowledge of some source. Yet I still thought that my words through Mr. Steinhart to the President and Mr. Hull had something to do with it, though what part they might play was hard to divine. Anyhow, that a matter so great as this should be taken up between America and Japan without my knowledge and tampered with by some other source, the Foreign Minister should at once resign, but seeing the situation so grave, I made up my mind to conduct the negotiation to a successful ending if possible. Succeeding or failing, in the end I would take the whole responsibility and resign.

This was the course I mapped out for my conduct thereafter. Indeed I did my best in the negotiation to bring them to a success, preserving the national dignity of Japan and international good faith. But I studied carefully the draft wired by Admiral Nomura and proceeded to conduct the negotiations. I began to doubt success very much. The reasons may be roughly given as follows:

1. In the grave world situation the negotiations at Washington involved too many and intricate subjects. We must satisfy in some major way, the Japanese people as well as the Americans, and must also avoid giving any ground for misunderstanding or misgiving to Germany and Italy.

All of a sudden for Prince Konoye, our Premier, to meet the President in Honolulu or to dispatch our navy to exchange felicitations with the American Navy, would greatly astound Germany and Italy. In any case, these things must be communicated beforehand to Germany and Italy, preventing misunderstanding and misgiving.

Besides, Prince Konoye's conference with the President at Honolulu would be very delicate, and if it ended in rupture, it might have an element of danger to lead two countries to further estrangement even to the brink of war. Before they meet we must agree between America and Japan on main points which are to be limited to as few as possible. In any case, in a grave situation like ours, we must not try to reach an agreement on too many things and settle too many details at once.

2. I doubted if both the American and Japanese authorities who started the negotiations were entirely sincere. Of course I did not doubt Admiral Nomura's sincerity at all but the men who were manipulating from Tokyo or elsewhere behind him, I doubted very much their sincerity. On the other hand, America might be thinking of closing the door behind and making sure that Japan would not attack from the Pacific, and she would join the war in Europe or might even be, by negotiating with Japan, testing the attitude and determination of Japan; how strong or how weak. In those days the American attitude and action towards European war were becoming every day more positive.

3. In negotiating like this, the national dignity must be upheld and international good faith must be observed. The Japanese side was simply in begging, stooping down to the President and Mr. Hull, no dignity on our part, while the highest liaison conference seemed to have agreed, before I came back to

Tokyo, that as a matter of course the negotiations with America were to be conducted in secrecy to Germany and Italy.

When I took part in the conference the evening of the day I got back to Tokyo, I recall someone said in the conference that Japan is an independent country and is not certainly obliged to confer with Germany and Italy on every foreign affair or negotiation with any other country, whereupon I replied, that that depended on the matters or affairs Japan is taking up; concerning the pending negotiations which were of such importance, some communication to some extent must be made to Germany and Italy.

Japan was obliged to do so to preserve good faith and that did not encroach upon the independence of Japan nor permit Germany and Italy to interfere with the negotiations.

4. During negotiations like this, it is usual to "give in" on both sides as you proceed, but Mr. Hull showed a stiffer attitude as we went on.

For instance, in later negotiations Mr. Hull wished his speech condemning Germany to be made an appendix to the present convention, or to make Japan accept the American views of the European war. Of course, Japan could not agree without seeming to show bad faith with Germany and Italy to such things.

Although the American-Japanese understanding could have been reached on the Pacific and China problem without reference to the European war, or without Japan committing such bad faith, why America brought in such unnecessary and extraneous matters I was at a loss to understand, unless America's move was to compel in the negotiations, Japan to practically cancel the Tripartite Pact which Japan could not very well do at the time.

5. The army and navy had been pressing me for some time to negotiate with France for permission to send Japanese forces to Saigon and its vicinity which request I put off as long as possible fearing such a move might lead to a clash with Great Britain. It seemed to me that the negotiations with America and the sending of Japanese forces to Southern Indo-China were irreconcilable too, and would make America doubt our sincerity in the negotiations. But the navy and army authorities contended that Singapore was augmenting its forces and might at any time invade Indo-China and that they wished to forestall such a move and prevent a clash with Great Britain. They said the move was not at all aggressive and some young officers called on me from the army at my house to explain where they wanted to send in forces, and to show me that the Japanese military airplanes did not enable them to fly and attack Singapore as they could not fly a long enough distance to do so. The names of these young officers I do not know: two or three officers called at my house.

I had in mind the upholding of the dignity of Japan and the observing of good international faith; tried my best to put the negotiations on a right track and to bring them to a successful ending. But the fall of the second Konoye Cabinet and my ill health prevented it, caused me to drop the negotiations quietly and to hope to take them up later when the opportune moment came and to then realize my fond dream of reaching a good understanding with America in the Pacific as well as with the China problem; eventually cooperating with America to end the war. I have been ever since, ill and convalescent to the present time.

HOW THE TRIPARTITE PACT WAS MADE

Several questions were put to German Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop but it seems that why I put these questions was not well understood.

Some time afterwards Mr. Stahmer was sent to Tokyo by Von Ribbentrop.

I do not know the exact dates of Mr. Stahmer's calls on me. It was though, the early part of September, soon after he reached Tokyo. I received him in my private house which General Ott, the German Ambassador and Stahmer visited, and after the introduction of Mr. Stahmer by General Ott, I immediately started to ask my questions. My first question was: - what Germany thought of America at the time. Mr. Stahmer replied Germany wanted to avoid America's ever joining the war. Here I took the liberty of asking Mr. Stahmer who was answering my questions, what authority Mr. Stahmer had in answering me. Mr. Stahmer answered that I might consider his words as coming directly from Mr. Von Ribbentrop, the German Foreign Minister. Thereupon I proceeded to put further questions before him. I asked how Germany intended to deal with America after the European war. Mr. Stahmer replied that Germany intended to improve relations with America after the war and wished to be on friendly terms with her. Then I said that I was anxious that Japan and America should never fight and that Japan must do everything humanly possible to avoid it. Japan's relations with America must be improved and readjusted. Japan wished to see the most cordial relations with America in the future. I said further, concerning Soviet Russia, that Japan has been for years negotiating for a non-aggression or neutrality treaty at Moscow, but in vain. Japan wished to solve many outstanding and unpleasant matters between the two countries and readjust relations. I asked Mr. Stahmer was it possible for Germany to use her good offices and help Japan in this score? Mr. Stahmer responded immediately that Germany would do so.

We talked generally about the war and the world situation. I remember it was about two hours or so before we parted. I reported roughly about this meeting to the Premier, Army and Navy Ministers and they authorized me to proceed.

I met Mr. Stahmer and General Ott several times in my house and finally the German-Japanese pact (later including Italy it became the Tripartite Pact as described elsewhere) draft was initiated; the German side seem to have referred the matter several times to Berlin.

To recapitulate, the foundation of the pact was the Hakko-Ichiu old Japanese ideal, but the immediate bases were: 1) to avoid the participation of a powerful country like America in the European war. 2) prevention of, or not to do anything by either Germany or Japan leading to American-Japanese war. 3) Germany to use good offices with Soviet Russia and help Japan to conclude non-aggression or neutrality pact with Soviet Russia and readjust relations otherwise. These points must have been understood well from publication and utterance at the time.

In short, it was an effort to stop enlarging the theater of war and to prevent a real world conflagration.

This is why I said at the time that the Tripartite Pact was a peace pact and not a war alliance as stated elsewhere.

I may add that aside from the agreement Germany and Japan reached, I had other considerations of my own for Japan to wit:

1. To come very close to Germany to prevent Berlin to direct the American citizens of German origin, to carry out propaganda against Japan with the aim of bringing about American-Japanese war. The American citizens of German blood and origin were said to number twenty millions or more, six millions of whom were born and later naturalized in America. Some of them are well connected with Germany, and have apparently harmless societies or associations such as amateur artists or theater clubs literary associations, etc. which are highly recognized and can be used as tools of Berlin. It was my opinion that if such mischievous propaganda is ever carried out, there would be no means of stopping it and we would see an American-Japanese war in a half year. I trust anyone who has studied this point and followed it to its basis will agree with me.
2. To prevent the theater widening out to what we call Greater East Asia and to preserve peace in these regions.
3. To use German influence and good offices to induce China to directly approach and negotiate with Japan to end the Chinese incident. This was actually tried later on.
4. To put Japan and Soviet Russia on sound and good relations, so that we could approach them after America with strong and self-respectable attitude on one hand and sincerity and broad mind on the other. Thus I hoped, we could reach a peaceful understanding in the Pacific and on the Chinese question. In approaching America, I made it a sine qua non that Japan should eventually but as soon as possible withdraw her forces from China.

When this could be done Japan, I thought in America's eyes, was in a position to offer America Japan's cooperation in bringing about the end of the British-German war in Europe, although the fall of the second Konoze Cabinet and my illness prevented me from any attempt of this latter part of my plan.

I considered the withdrawal of Japanese forces from China as the crux of the situation. If this was not done America would not trust Japan's sincerity. Yet, this withdrawal of Japanese forces from China was very difficult for Japan but I was considering it in the problem of approaching America very carefully. A principle of my international dealing was that any promise given must be faithfully carried out, or else one should never promise.

日米交渉

服部 譯

私ハ歸朝後直ニ伊勢神宮ニ參拜セネバナラナカッタガ、其ノ際ニ風邪ヲ引キ
 カナリ咳モ出タノデ（後ニナツテ當時ニ結核ノ氣味ガアツタ事ガ判明シタ）
 數日間ハ引籠ツテ居ラネバナラナカッタ。私ハ我國大使タル野村提督カラ送
 ヲテ來ラレタ日米諒解案ヲ檢討シテ元タノデアアルガ、其ノ後結果同交渉ガ私
 ノ關知セサル根據ノ下ニ推進セシメラレテキルモノデアルト信スルニ至ツ
 タ。然シ夫デモ尙私ハ「スタインハルト」氏ヲ通ジテノ大統領並ニハル氏ヘ
 ノ傳言ガ此ノ交渉ト何等ノノ關聯ガアルト考ヘテ居タノデアアルガ、ソレガ如
 何ナル役割ヲ演ジテキルモノカハ判斷ノ限リデハナカッタ。兎ニ角モ、日米
 間ニカ、ル重要交渉ガ私ノ知ラヌ間ニ開始サレ、且ソレガ他ノ有力筋ノ容喩
 ニヨルモノデアアル以上、外務大臣トシテハ直チニ辭職スベキデアルト考ヘタ
 ノデハアルガ、時局ノ容易ナラヌヲ見テハ、私モ出來ルコトナラ交渉ヲ妥結
 セシメタイ決心スルニ至ツタ。結果ハ其ノ成否ニ拘ラス自己一身ニテ責任ヲ
 負ヒ、辭職スル考ヘダツタノデアアル。以上ガ私ノ計畫セル爾後ノ行動ニ就イ
 テノ方針デアッタ。

實ニ私ハ一方ニ我日本ノ國威ヲ傷ツケルコトナク且他方國際信義ヲ維持シ

ツツ交ヲノ圓滿妥結ヲ圖ラント最善ノ努力ヲ盡シタノデアツタ。

私ハ野村樞督ヨリ受信セル諒解案ヲ慎重檢討シ、引續キ交渉ヲ行ハントシ
タノデアルガ、交渉ノ成立ニハ非常ニ疑ヒヲ懷キ始メタ。其ノ理由トシテ
既略以下ヲ述ベテ見タイト思フ。

(一) 當時ノ世界重大時局下ニアツテハ華府ニ於ケル交渉ハ余リニモ多クノ且

複雑ナル問題ヲ呈上ニアゲテキタ。吾々ハ大局的ニ見地ニ於テ米國側ハ

モトヨリノコト日本國民ヲモ満足セシメネバナラス且、獨逸及伊太利ニ

對シテ些カデモ諒解乃至疑念ヲ起サセルコトヲ避ケネバナライ。首相

近衛公ガイキナリ「ホノルル」デ米大統領ト會見シタリ、或ハ或ハ海

軍ヲ派遣シテ米國海軍ト交戦セシメタリスルナラバ、必ズヤ獨逸ニ衝突

ヲ與ヘルコトニナルデアラウ。何レノ場合ニシテモ、此ノ種ノ事柄ニ就

テハ、
、豫ジメ獨逸ニ連絡ヲナシ、誤解疑念ノ起ラザルヨウニ

セネバナラス。

更ニ近衛公ト米大統領ノ「ホノルル」會談ノ件ハ極メテ微妙ナル問題ニシ

テ、若シ真一會談決裂ニ終ルナラバ兩國ノ關係ヲ更ニ疎隔セシメ戦争ノ

一步手前迄追ヒ込ム危險ヲ藏シテキナイトハ云ヘナイアラウ。兩者ノ會見前ニ日米間ニ於テハ主要事項ヲ出来ル限リ最小限ニ限ルヤウニ協定テオカネバナラヌ。何レニシテモ兩國ノ當面スル緊急狀況下ニアツテハ決シテ多クノ問題ニツキ妥結ヲ見ントカ又一舉ニ細目事項ニ亘ツテ迄モ解カント試ミテハナラナイ

(二) 私ハ交渉ノ開始セル日米兩國ノ當局者ガ眞ニ誠意ヲ有スルカドウカ疑ツタノデアル。勿論私ハ野村提督ノ誠意ハ毫モ疑ハナカツタノデアルガ、彼ノ背後ニ隠シテ東京若シクハ具ノ他ノ個所ヨリ彼ヲ操レル人々ニ就イテハ大イニ其ノ誠意ヲ怪シンデキタノデアツタ。

他方、米國ハ背後ノ門戸ヲ明サシマハウト考ヘテキルカモ知レナイシ、更ニ日本ガ太平洋側ヨリハ攻撃ヲ加ヘナイコトヲ確メタ上デ、歐洲ノ戰爭ニ參加セントシテキルノカモ知レナイシ、或ハ日本トノ交渉ヲ通シテソノ態度及決意ガドノ程度ニ鞏固ナモノデアルガ或ハ弱イモノデアルカラ試メサントシテキルトモ考ヘラレル。當時ハ歐洲戰ニ對スル米國側ノ態度及ヒ行動ハ日増シニ積極化シテキタノデアツタ。

同此類交渉ニ於テハ、家ノ威信ヲ保持スルト同時ニ國際的ニ信義モ亦遵守
セラルベシトイフノデアリマス。日本側ハ全ク強硬的ニ態度ヲ持シ、本

統領並ニハル氏ニ對シテ辭ヲ低クシ全然威嚴ガ認メラレズ、其間ニ私

ノ東京前ニ於テ最高指導會議ニ於テハ米國トノ交渉ハ當然獨伊ニハ内密
ニ行ハルベキ旨決定シタヤウニ窺ハレタ。

東京當日ノ夕方私ガ其ノ會議ニ參加シタ際ニ誰カガ日本ハ獨立國家デア
リ、必ズシモ、アラユル對外問題乃至ハ他國トノ交渉ニ就キ一々獨伊ト

協議スル義務ハナイト云ツタコトヲ憶エテキル。ソコデ私ハ是ハ全ク日

本ノ處理スル事柄ノ性質ニヨルモノデアリ現在進行中ノ交渉ノ如キ重要

問題ニツイテハ何ラカノ程度ノ連絡ハ獨伊ニ對シテ爲サザルベキデア

ト答ヘタノデアツタ。日本ハ信義ヲ維持スル爲ニモ余儀ナク斯クスルベ

キデアツタガ、此ノハ何モ日本ノ自主權ヲ侵害スルモノデモナカツタ。

伊ラシテ交渉ニ容喙スルコトヲ許容スルモノデモナカツタ。此

此類交渉ニ於テハ其ノ進捗ニツレ、兩者ニ於テ夫々ニ進歩スルノガ例

デアルガ、ハル氏ハ反對ニ漸次態度ヲ硬化シタノデアツタ。

其ノ例トシテ、後日ノ交渉ニ於テハル氏ハ同氏ノ如シテ非難セル演説ヲ
同協約ニ追加スルコトヲ希望シ或ハス洲戰ニ對スル米側ノ見解ヲ日大
ニ承認セシメントシタ。勿論日本トシテハ石ノ如キヲ認メルコトハ勿伊
ニ對スル不信實ヲ表明シナイ限り到底能ク爲シ得ナイ所デアル。

太平洋及支那問題ニツイテハ何等歐洲國ト關連ナシニ或ハ日本ガ右
 ノヤウナ不信行爲ヲ犯サナイデモ十分ニ日米ノ諒解ハ成立シ得タニ
 モ洵ラズ何故ニ米國ガ斯カル不必要且關連性ナキ事柄ヲ持チ出シタノ
 カ果シテ米國ノ措置ガ日本ノ當時到底爲シ得ナカツタ三國協定ノ廢棄
 チ實際上強ヒヨウトシタモノデアルカドウカ私ハ判斷ニ苦シムダノデ
 アツタ

(五)

陸海軍ハ以前ヨリ日本軍ノサイゴン及其周邊地區進駐ノ許可ヲ得ルヨ
 ウニ佛蘭西ト交渉スルコトヲ私ニ迫ツタノデアルガ、斯カル行動ガ英
 國トノ衝突ヲ惹起センコトヲ恐レテ私ハ出來ル丈其ノ要求ヲ延引シテ
 居ツタノデアル。私ニトツテハ米國トノ交渉及南部佛印ヘノ日本軍派
 遣トイフコトハ全ク矛盾シテキルヤウニ思ハレ米國ヲシテ此ノ交渉ニ
 對スル我方ノ驕育ヲ擧ハセルモノデアルト考ヘラレタノデアル
 然シ陸海軍當局ハ「シンガポール」ノ兵力が逐次増強サレツツアリハ
 イツナンドキ印度支那ヘ侵入スルカ分ラナイト主張シ當局ノ望ムノハ
 實ニカカル英側ノ行動ノ機先ヲ制シ以テ英國トノ衝突ヲ防止セントス

ルニ在ルト云フノデアッタ。彼等ハ其ノ意圖スル行動ハ全然侵略的ナ
モノデハナイト云ヒ何人カノ陸軍青年將校ハ私ノ宅ヲ訪レテ軍隊ヲ遣
陸セシメントスル個所ヲ説明シ且日本陸軍機ハ長距離飛行ニ堪ヘザル
故「シンガポール」迄行ツテ攻撃ヲ加ヘルコトハ不可能デアルコトヲ
示シタ。是等青年將校ノ氏名ハ思ヒ出セナイガ二人カ三人ダツタヤウ
ニ思フ

私ハ日本ノ國威ヲ宣揚シ且正シク國際信義ヲ守ツテ行カウト考ヘ最善
ヲ爲シテ日米交渉ヲ正常ナ軌道ニノセ以テ國體安結ヲ圖リタイト努力ヲ
シタ

然シ此二次近衛内閣ノ瓦解及ビ私自刃ノ病氣ノ爲ニ遂ニ能ク爲シ得ナ
カッタノデアアル。幸シク云フナラバ一時交渉ヲ平穩裡ニ打切り改メテ
適當ナ時機ニ至ビ是ヲ再開シ以テ私ノ夢想シテ已マザル米國トノ完全
ナル諒解ヘノ到達ヲ支那國體ハ勿論ノコト太平洋ニ關シテモ實現セシ
メ終局ニ於テハ現爭ヲ終結セシメンガ爲ニ米國ト協力スルニイフコト
ガ終ニ出來ナカッタノデアアル。偏來今日ニ至ル迄私ハ大部分ノ日ヲ病
床デ過シタノデアアル